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Imperialisms Past and Present in EU Economic Relations with North Africa: 




The EU is actively pursuing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) as part 
of its trade and aid relations with former colonies in North Africa. Utilising the discourse of pro-
poor business growth and win-win free trade, the EU insists that North African countries must 
acquiesce to DCFTA liberalisation to achieve sustainable development. This article critiques the 
paternalism of EU actors amidst their focus on completing these controversial DCFTAs. Drawing 
upon Nkrumah’s and Fanon’s articulation of the concept of neo-colonialism, it argues that the EU 
is cementing colonial-style patterns of production via iniquitous trade and aid arrangements. 
Moreover, the article illustrates that EU elites in their justification of the DCFTAs are replicating 
the colonial-era discourse surrounding Eurafrica and the alleged economic ‘complementarity’ 
and inevitable ‘interdependence’ of the European and African continents: An amnesiac Europe 
thus simultaneously draws upon European colonial imaginaries in the justification of neo-colonial 
DCFTAs while downplaying, and forgetting, the regressive legacies of colonial trade relations. 
The article also demonstrates how certain North African campaigners are already drawing 
attention to the neo-colonial contours of the DCFTAs in order to delegitimise these free trade 
vehicles vis-à-vis North African and European public opinion. 
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The European Union (EU) is actively pursuing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements (DCFTAs) in the Arab Mediterranean. Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have been 
identified as key partners with whom the European Commission wishes to conclude DCFTAs 
as part of an eventual African-European bi-continental free trade zone (Chadwick 2018). The 
DCFTAs will not only ensure that EU-North African trade remains compliant with World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) regulations regarding mutual tariff liberalisation. But, they will 
ostensibly provide a necessary stimulus to Arab Mediterranean economies. In this sense, the 
DCFTAs are viewed as a genuine opportunity for win-win co-operation. And, by assisting 
‘weaker’ developing countries through DCFTAs, the EU presents itself as a benevolent 
partner for sustainable development. This aligns with Nicolaidis (2015) and her conceptual 
focus on EU strategies of ‘amnesia’, ‘redirection’, and ‘atonement’ - as explored by Pace 
and Roccu (this special issue) in the introduction to this special issue. 
Despite the EU’s normative discourse, however, there is mounting evidence and 
adjacent civil society concerns that the DCFTAs will not provide a genuine opportunity for 
win-win economic growth. In particular, there is concern that the EU is utilising the DCFTAs 
as a device to lock-in poorer countries into colonial-style patterns of raw material exports 
married to importation of higher-value, processed commodities (see Swearingen 1988 for a 
comprehensive account of colonial economics in the region). Analysis of the likely empirical 
implications of DCFTAs already points to the dangers of premature trade liberalisation for 
emerging sectors in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt (GPA and Solidar 2013). 
Accordingly, the article examines the DCFTAs and their likely impact for the Arab 
Mediterranean in terms of Europe’s imperial past and its neo-colonial present. It explores 
how Europe simultaneously draws upon a colonial Eurafrican discourse of economic 
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‘complementarity’ and ‘interdependence’ to justify DCFTAs, while at the same time 
downplaying the implications of neo-colonial ties (also see Pace and Roccu [2019]) in this 
special issue for a discussion of Eurafrica as a concept). In this process, the article engages 
contemporary literature that highlights the imperial contours of EU trade external agendas, 
notably Zielonka (2006); Del Sarto (2016); Nicolaidis (2015); Pasture (2018); and Thorpe 
(2018). Crucially, however, the article emphasises that it is necessary to re-engage writers 
from the Global South whose works date back to the onset of neo-colonialism in the 1960s. 
Namely, it is vital to re-engage the work of Kwame Nkrumah (1965) and Frantz Fanon 
(1961) with regards to the practical strategies of the European project in its construction of 
the neo-colonial present. By doing so, it becomes possible to more fully understand – and to 
challenge – EU neo-colonialism as embodied in the contemporary DCFTA agenda.  
The discussion is structured as follows. The first section examines the theoretical 
literature pertaining to the EU’s imperial past and neo-colonial present. The second section 
then unpacks the DCFTA agenda in terms of its imperial legacies and neo-colonial contours. 
The third section then highlights the likely empirical consequences of DCFTAs for vital 
sectors in the Arab Mediterranean. The conclusion then restates the dubious ethical 
consequences of Europe’s amnesiac ‘forgetting’ of imperial histories and downplaying of a 
neo-colonial present. 
 
Theorising Imperialism Past and Present in EU External Trade and Economic Agendas 
 
The European Commission (2005; 2006; 2019a; 2019b; 2018) regularly invokes a progressive 
‘development’ discourse in its trade relations. European officials state that free trade between 
EU member states and developing countries will lead to gains for all parties. Namely, the EU 
will gain access to lucrative emerging markets – such as telecommunications – and secure long-
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term access to vital agricultural and mineral raw commodities. In return, developing countries 
will gain access to foreign capital, European consumer markets, and potential Aid for Trade. 
Through win-win free trade deals, the EU can thus contribute to poverty reduction in the Global 
South. EU discourse in this fashion corroborates the analysis of Nicolaidis (2015) and her 
conceptual focus on ‘atonement’ as a chief strategy deployed by European officials in their 
dealings with former colonial possessions. 
 Interestingly, the EU’s liberal trade discourse of economic complementarity, 
interdependence, and win-win trade co-operation is echoed within the scholarly liberal 
literature. Certain liberal scholars - such as Gruhn (1976) and Stevens and Kennan (2005) – 
have historically maintained that the EU is slowly but surely inching towards a genuine 
interdependence in trade relations with developing countries. In so doing, such scholars broadly 
maintain that the European Commission is i. sincere in its policy pronouncements to ‘do good’ 
via enhanced trade linkages, and ii. is successfully realising a progressive model of trade 
relations that moves beyond colonial-era dependency (in which developing countries remained 
economically subordinate to the metropole as suppliers of raw materials and importers of 
higher-value consumables). 
 However, there is a critical theoretical tradition in the scholarly literature which 
convincingly illustrates how the EU is pursuing imperial and/or neo-colonial strategies in its 
economic dealings with the Global South. For instance, Galtung (1973), Hurt (2003), and Nunn 
and Price (2004) have historically demonstrated how EU trade policies entrench commercial 
prerogatives in Africa at the expense of the long-term growth of their poorer partners. In 
particular, there is evidence that the EU pursues trade liberalisation in the Global South for the 
benefit of European industry (which secures access to a foreign consumer base as well as to 
raw materials), despite the corollary that this stifles opportunities for developing countries to 
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build their own competitive muscle. As a result there are accusations that the EU is effectively 
‘kicking-away-the-ladder’ of development since infant industry collapses in developing 
countries upon import flooding of cheaper European wares precipitated upon the 
implementation of premature free trade agreements, to the detriment of local industrialisation 
and economic diversification (c.f. Chang 2002).  
 In the current era of DCFTAs, a number of contemporary critical writings have 
theorised how EU trade policies (among other policy instruments) perpetuate imperial and neo-
colonial forms of North-South relations. Del Sarto (2016), for instance, convincingly argues 
how the EU supports pliable local elites via aid as a means of maintaining colonial patterns of 
economic interaction. Salem (2019) in this special issue, and Zielonka (2006), meanwhile, 
theorise about the economic aspects of domination. In particular, Zielonka (2006) queries 
whether the EU can only maintain its own labour and environmental standards by imposing 
them onto partners within trade agreements. In a related vein, Nicolaidis (2015) claims that EU 
external agendas can be viewed in terms of the concept of imperial ‘redirection’. This involves 
the EU’s pursuit of internal deep integration, followed by the pursuit of external influence by 
the united European entity. Free trade agendas – such as the DCFTAs – can therefore usefully 
be interpreted (qua Nicolaidis) as part of European redirection strategies – by externally 
projecting Europe’s collective power impulses. 
 Furthermore, contributions from Martin (1982), Hansen and Jonsson (2014), Pasture 
(2018) and Thorpe (2018) have illustrated how historical imperial discourse continues to inform 
EU external agendas. In particular, these authors have collectively pointed to the Eurafrican 
foundations of the European project and how the EU today makes claims as to the alleged 
economic ‘complementarity’ and ‘interdependence’ of Europe and Africa, in alignment with 
Eurafrican colonial discourse popularised in the 1950s. As Martin (1982: 222) explains, the 
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twin concepts of economic complementarity and interdependence between Europe and Africa 
formed, and today still form, cornerstones of an imperial Eurafrican vision. 
 However, while this critical European scholarship helps to correctly conceptualise EU 
imperial ‘redirection’ and to highlight Eurafrican legacies, it is vital to re-engage critical 
literature from the Global South. In particular, re-engagement with the classic works of 
intellectuals such as Kwame Nkrumah (1965), Frantz Fanon (1961), as well as Sekou Touré 
(1962) - among others - can rebalance our contemporary analyses of Europe’s dealings with 
developing countries. Usefully, Nkrumah’s unpacking of neo-colonialism in Africa can help 
us to understand the EU’s collective pursuit of free trade deals such as the DCFTAs. Nkrumah 
(1965: ix) usefully defined the phenomenon in the following terms: 
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, 
independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In 
reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed by the outside. 
And as Pace and Roccu (2019:2) in this special issue illustrate, this critique of neo-
colonialism can also be found within Fanon’s work, which warned that without full economic 
and political sovereignty, decolonisation would be nothing more than a surface shift for the new 
formally independent states. With regards to European external powers, meanwhile, Nkrumah 
(1965) explicitly warned his African contemporaries that the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) would seek to achieve a neo-colonial dominance over erstwhile colonies. 
Namely, that the EEC would cajole de jure independent states in Africa into ‘Association’ 
agreements that would necessitate prematurely open markets and continued economic 
dependence. Nkrumah (1965) – and his pan-African ally Sekou Touré (1962) – warned here 
that the unconditional opening of markets as part of Association between the European 
7 
 
Economic Community (EEC) and African states would foreclose the possibility of industrial 
diversification in advance, leading to economic and political dependency.  
In Touré’s (1962: 141) memorable allusion to a biblical verse, African countries would 
remain “hewers of wood and drawers of water” if Association enabled the EEC to have 
unfettered access to African markets. The influx of cheap European imports would decimate 
infant industry and would ensure that African countries would remain economically dependent 
on raw material exports to the EEC metropole. Nkrumah and Touré therefore warned 
Francophone African states against the perpetuation of Association under the Yaoundé 
Conventions (1963-1975). Indeed, Association had already begun under the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome without any consent from then colonies, and were controversially renewed under 
Yaoundé. As Segal (1964: 87) succinctly remarks in his contemporaneous account: 
President Nkrumah’s objections to associated status are both economic and 
ideological. According to him, associated states will perpetuate neo-colonialism 
and provide a fundamental obstacle to the achievement of African political and 
economic unity, which is the sole means whereby African states can overcome 
their lack of development. 
Moreover, and with parallels to Nicolaidis (2015), Nkrumah also warned that EEC aid 
monies would be used as a lubricant to secure the acquiescence of African leaders to 
Association and to trade agreements that stifled long-term economic growth in the continent. 
In clear terms he laid out the possible usages of aid monies to subvert empirical state 
sovereignty in newly independent African countries: 
Control over government policy in the neo-colonial state may be secured by 
payments towards the costs of running the state, by the provision of civil servants 
in positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign 
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exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperialist 
power (1965: ix). 
The noxious marriage of aid monies to disadvantageous trade deals was, meanwhile, reiterated 
by Fanon. Having established links with Nkrumah during his time in Ghana, Fanon (1961: 76) 
wrote in similar terms of the dangers of neo-colonialism, aid money, and asymmetric trade: 
The former dominated country becomes an economically dependent country. The 
ex-colonial power, which has kept intact and sometimes even reinforced its 
colonialist trade channels agrees to provision the budget of the independent 
national by small [aid] injections. 
 Crucially, however, both Nkrumah and Fanon emphasised how African actors were not 
passive recipients of neo-colonial intrusions by European powers in the Cold War context. 
Nkrumah (1965: 33), in particular, emphasised that certain African elites would willingly 
embrace trade and aid overtures from foreign powers in order to lubricate their own domestic 
patronage networks. Rather than seek to break from colonial patterns of trade and economic 
exchange, some African leaderships would work with former colonial centres to lever in aid 
monies and to gain foreign support for their rule (oftentimes including military assistance) 
(ibid). Despite the fact that neo-colonial trade relations would retard efforts for poverty 
reduction and industrialisation, some pliable African elites would sacrifice their citizenries’ 
longer-term economic wellbeing for their immediate power purposes. Fanon, meanwhile, 
explained this same phenomenon in terms of African leaderships who would reject the austerity 
politics likely necessitated in the short term from a break from colonial trade ties. Such leaders 
would choose the path of least resistance by allying themselves to foreign powers: 
Other countries of the Third World refuse to undergo this ordeal and agree to get 
over it by accepting the conditions of the former guardian power. These countries 
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use their strategic position--a position which accords them privileged treatment in 
the struggle between the two blocs -- to conclude treaties and give undertakings. 
The former dominated country becomes an economically dependent country. 
(Fanon 1961: 76).  
For both Nkrumah and Fanon, therefore, strategies for overcoming neo-colonial incursions, and 
temptations, would be found within pan-African alliances. Only through the eventual creation 
of a Union of African States would African leaderships enjoy the political and economic clout 
to meaningfully diversify economic systems away from colonial patterns of trade, and to do 
away with corrupting aid dependence (Langan 2017: 219-220).  
Interestingly for the current consideration of DCFTAs, Nkrumah also condemned what 
he deemed as artificial demarcations between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (Langan 
2017: 220). As part of this pan-African sensibility, he famously formed a political relationship 
with Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser, later marrying an Egyptian national. His Casablanca Group 
of States (African states which favoured a rapid move to unity within a federal state) in the 
1960s also found much political support from the Moroccan monarchy (hence Casablanca). 
With the warnings about neo-colonial forms of North-South relations in mind it is now relevant 
to explore the EU’s pursuit of DCFTAs in the Arab Mediterranean. 
Imperialisms Past and Present in Europe’s DCFTAs in the Arab Mediterranean 
The EU’s DCFTA agenda has been launched in the context of Association Agreements with 
each of the targeted partners in the Arab Mediterranean. The Association Agreements – similar 
to the Cotonou Agreement signed between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries – lay out a framework for political, economic and social interaction between Europe 
and its partners. In the case of Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, their Association Agreements lay 
the bedrock for the ongoing negotiations towards free trade deals embodied within the 
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DCFTAs. Importantly – and with echoes of Nkrumah (1965) and his concept of neo-colonialism 
– these Association Agreements also lay the conditions for the flow of oftentimes substantial 
aid monies from Brussels to the signatories. This frequently has taken the form of budget 
support – namely financial transfers direct to central governments– as warned against by Fanon 
in terms of the foreign provisioning of African budgets (c.f. Langan 2015a). Simultaneously, 
therefore, North African governments have entered into controversial DCFTA negotiations 
while being funded in no small measure by EU aid monies.  
 It is important, however, to contextualise the DCFTAs in the Arab Mediterranean in 
terms of a wider African policy pursued by the EU. Since the publication of the European 
Commission’s (1996) Green Paper on the Future of EU Relations with the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) Countries, the European Commission has made abundantly clear that its 
intention is to forge ahead with free trade deals with former colonies in the continent. 
Embracing a strategy of amnesia (Nicolaidis 2015), the Green Paper (1996: 11) declares that 
the “colonial period and the post-colonial period” are behind us, and that therefore the parties 
are able to express themselves “less ambiguously”. The Green Paper also goes on to claim that 
‘reciprocal’ free trade between Europe and developing countries can enable all to flourish 
within competitive global markets.  
In the context of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement (2000: 26) itself, this progressive 
discourse is restated, with the text claiming that EPAs can help ACP countries to realise 
“smooth and gradual integration” into globalised markets. In particular, market-opening under 
free trade deals is seen as a vital stimulus for private sector activities, and as a means of 
disciplining less competitive industries to naturally wind-down upon liberalisation. Again, with 
emphasis on aid monies, the Cotonou Agreement promises that finances will be made available 
to ensure ACP countries’ fair entry into globalised markets. Thus, the EU has delivered 
11 
 
substantial sums to ACP countries in the form of both budget support (to national governments) 
as well as Aid for Trade (AfT) delivered through the European Development Fund (EDF). This 
has attracted condemnation in relation to the concept of neo-colonialism, with such aid monies 
being seen as tied to the EU’s controversial pursuit of EPA free trade deals (Langan 2015a; 
2017). 
 It is in this wider African context that we must position the DCFTA economic agenda. 
The European Commission, to a large extent, is seeking to replicate its free trade orientation 
towards the ACP countries in its dealings with North Africa (since the ACP bloc includes only 
sub-Saharan African states and not those of the Arab Mediterranean). This is especially 
apparent with the close of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020. The European Commission is 
increasingly emphasising the need to have a relationship with the African Union [AU] 
(including its North African constituents) amidst the planned African Continental Free Trade 
Area (AfCFTA), rather than with the ACP bloc. In fact, the ACP group is sometimes seen as 
an unsightly relic of the colonial past (again corroborating a politics of amnesia as outlined by 
Nicolaidis).  
Accordingly, the DCFTAs are not only building blocks towards an eventual Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement (EMFTA) as anticipated as far back as the 1995 
Barcelona Declaration. In the context of EU-AU relations, the DCFTAs are in fact building 
blocks towards a Eurafrican free trade zone. This was recently confirmed within the final State 
of the Union address of President Juncker of the European Commission. He explained in direct 
terms that the EU planned to ‘develop the numerous trade agreements between African and EU 
countries into a continental free-trade agreement, an economic partnership between equal 
partners’ (Chadwick 2018). DCFTAs would thus form significant first-phase components 
(alongside EPAs in sub-Saharan Africa) of a future projected bi-continental free trade zone. 
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 Crucially in terms of imperial legacies, however, the Eurafrican implications of the 
DCFTAs not only find expression in terms of the future ambition of the EU to use these as a 
stepping-stone to a wider Euro-African free trade area. Rather, the EU’s contemporary 
discursive reliance upon narratives relating to Eurafrican concepts of economic 
complementarity and interdependence heavily draws upon historical imperial legacies that are 
regularly forgotten in the pursuit of free trade deals (as Nicolaidis rightly terms - a strategy of 
amnesia). As recently as March 2018, the then Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, 
reaffirmed Europe’s rhetorical commitment to the core concepts of complementarity and 
interdependence as a means of justifying the DCFTAs, the EMFTA, and eventually a Euro-
African free trade zone: 
There are some who think trade is a competition. But we know it is not a zero-
sum game. Our products feed into each other's value chains; they are vital to each 
other's economies and support each other's societies (European Commission, 
2018, emphasis added). 
This echoes the language of her predecessors, especially Peter Mandelson, who also 
justified the pursuit of DCFTAs in terms of seeking “a strengthened partnership between close 
and interdependent neighbours” (European Commission 2007; emphasis added). This 
conceptual focus on interdependence and complementary is unsurprising given the fact that the 
European Commission has long stressed the centrality of trade ties as part of a Euro-
Mediterranean ‘alliance’. Even before the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 which launched 
negotiations for the DCFTAs, the European Commission (1993) made clear that a “Euro-
Maghreb” partnership would seek to “anchor” the Arab Mediterranean to the European 
continent, and that this alliance would explicitly utilise trade as a foundation: ‘trade is obviously 
a crucial area, both for economic development and interdependence. It is the very symbol of 
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the Maghreb’s and the Community’s desire for partnership’ (emphasis added). This is 
corroborated by Morillas and Soleri i Lecha (2017: 4) who explain that the foundations of the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership focused on interdependence as a conceptual anchor: 
the Mediterranean was a challenge. From that point of view, it was inevitable and 
even natural to intensify cooperation between the EU and the Southern and 
Eastern Mediterranean countries. The magic word was “interdependence”. The 
European Commission (1994: 2), for instance, listed environment, energy, 
migration, trade and investment as “areas of Euro-Mediterranean 
interdependence” and considered that Europeans had “a vital interest in helping 
Mediterranean countries meet the challenges they face”. 
Through such Eurafrican discursive strategies, Europe is represented as a ‘force for 
good’, thus downplaying any accusations that it is acting as a neo-colonial power through 
imposition of premature trade liberalisation (with the concomitant decline of industry in African 
states and the lock-in of colonial patterns of raw material export to the metropole). With 
parallels to much academic literature on ‘normative power Europe’, the EU is thus held as a 
benevolent contributor to development (Pace 2007: 1045).  
Furthermore, the EU’s discursive focus on economic interdependence vis-à-vis the Arab 
Mediterranean has recently evolved to include security concerns in light of 9/11, the Arab 
Spring and the migration ‘crisis’. Trade politics thus remain at the fore of the relationship – 
with free trade deals now increasingly viewed as important for security through the potential 
creation of jobs for young men. Economic interdependence therefore becomes part of tackling 
what Federica Mogherini regularly refers to as the “root causes of poverty and irregular 
migration” (cited in Chadwick 2017). Crucially this trade-security nexus itself draws upon 
imperial discourse and legacies – re-articulating imperial Eurafrican narratives that while the 
14 
 
Arab Mediterranean is a valuable economic ‘complement’ to Europe, that nevertheless it is a 
zone of potential danger that must be controlled, or at least contained. As Cebeci and 
Schumacher (2017: 12) remark, this trade-security discourse: 
inevitably brings about the depiction of the target societies as defected and weak, 
unable to take care of themselves (i.e., pursue reforms or resolve conflicts) and 
thus in need of the EU’s help. One is reminded of the colonial logic – the mission 
civilisatrice. 
An imperial sensibility relating to Europe’s alleged cultural superiority thus pervades EU 
discourse even in economic matters. Eurafrican imperial mentalities are therefore clearly with 
us in the neo-colonial economic present, in terms of discourse impacting upon EU mindsets in 
the approach to trade ties with North African countries. Crucially, however, the imperial past 
itself is never fully acknowledged, within a politics of amnesia (see also Sierp in this special 
issue). 
  In addition to the amnestic utilisation of imperial discourse in the downplaying of neo-
colonial economic realities, it is also important to acknowledge coinciding EU discursive 
strategies of “atonement” and “redirection” (Nicolaidis 2015). In terms of atonement, the 
European Commission (2018b) insists that the DCFTAs represent a poverty alleviation boon in 
alignment with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Brushing aside North African 
civil society and trade union concerns, EU officials maintain that trade liberalisation is a 
necessity, not only in terms of compliance with WTO regulations, but for providing the means 
for pro-poor economic growth. Moreover, the European Commission insists that North African 
countries’ will be able to improve their social and environmental standing by conforming to EU 
production norms embodied in the acquis communitaire. The diffusion of EU norms – for 
example in terms of the restricted use of pesticides in vegetable production – will not only 
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benefit European consumers (who eventually eat imported produce from North Africa) – but 
will improve both social and ecological conditions in the Associated partners. In keeping with 
the concept of “redirection”, therefore, the EU projects its power prerogatives onto its 
neighbours – while discursively eschewing accusations of neo-colonialism via progressive 
narratives of sustainable development. EU trade policies – especially the DCFTAs –are 
therefore viewed as a legitimate and desirable contribution to a just form of North-South 
relations in keeping with the UN SDG agenda.  
Despite the EU’s discursive strategies, however, there has been substantial negative 
reaction within the Arab Mediterranean with regards to the DCFTAs. With echoes of Nkrumah 
(1965) and Fanon (1961), civil society movements and trade unions have voiced vociferous 
concerns that premature trade liberalisation will perpetuate neo-colonial forms of economic ties 
by hampering industrialisation and economic diversification. Free trade deals may protect Arab 
exporters’ access to EU markets in primary commodities such as vegetables and unprocessed 
agricultural goods. However, the conclusion of the DCFTAs will ensure unfettered access to 
North African markets for European producers of manufactured goods and processed 
agricultural commodities such as tomato paste and poultry. Accordingly, local industry and 
agro-processing units will likely close upon the import flooding of cheaper European wares. 
Accordingly, North African states will – to borrow Toure’s (1962) phrase – remain as “hewers 
of wood and drawers of water” – unable to diversify away from colonial patterns of production 
within neo-colonial North-South trade ties. The section below therefore examines the likely 
impact of the DCFTAs for poorer citizenries in the Arab Mediterranean. 




Despite the EU’s normative discursive focus on economic interdependence, trade 
complementarity, and poverty reduction in the Arab Mediterranean, it is immediately clear 
from the structure of the economic relationship that there is an inherent imbalance between the 
parties, perpetuating colonial-era trade asymmetries (see Swearingen 1988 for an account of 
colonial economics). Premature trade liberalisation under DCFTAs, in this context, will 
exacerbate existing inequalities based upon North African states’ subordinate economic 
position. As Martin convincingly argues, the DCFTAs (and EMFTA) will not even lead to 
‘reciprocal’ liberalisation conducive to Arab Mediterranean exports due to the EU’s 
protectionist policies. The discourse of free trade inherent within DCFTAs is thus somewhat 
fraudulent, since only the North African partners themselves are meaningfully opening their 
markets under the deals: 
 
Insomuch as EMFTAs [DCFTAs] are not truly reciprocal, because there is no 
corresponding liberalisation of agricultural exports to the EU in exchange for 
opening up Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) markets to European 
industrial products, the best that can be said is that EMFTAs are potentially 
damaging to the MPC economies and will do nothing to alleviate, let alone 
improve, their social situation (cited in Langan 2015b: 1834). 
 
Moreover, in relation to Zielonka’s (2006) discussion of the acquis communitaire, small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Arab Mediterranean will be compelled into adherence 
to the strict environmental and health standards of the EU within DCFTAs. This will be a 
barrier to upgrading and diversification into agro-processing, given the high costs involved 
with such conformity. This is consistent with Nkrumah’s (1965) warnings about neo-
colonialism (as well as Nicolaidis’s warnings of EU redirection strategies) in terms of the 
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impact of free trade arrangements that lock-in North African states into primary agricultural 
production. Under DCFTAs both tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) will remain in place in 
relation to North Africa’s processed agricultural goods (and manufactured wares) which might 
otherwise challenge European counterparts. 
Moreover, recent trade statistics demonstrate that colonial patterns of trade prevail. 
Tunisia and Morocco, for instance, remain highly dependent upon exports to Europe, as per 
colonial times. The EU is the largest trading partner for both Morocco and Tunisia, accounting 
respectively for 59.4% and 64% of their trade in 2017 (European Commission 2019a, 2019b). 
In that year, 64.6% of Morocco's and 78.5% of Tunisia’s exports went to the EU, and 56.5% 
of Morocco's and 54.3% of Tunisia’s imports came from the EU (European Commission 
2019a, 2019b). The composition of exports to the EU from both Morocco and Tunisia is very 
similar, being predominantly agricultural products, as well as textiles and clothing, and 
machinery and transport equipment. The exports from the EU are similarly dominated by 
machinery and transport equipment, fuels, metals and minerals, agricultural products, textiles 
and clothing. There is also a two-way trade in services between the parties.  
Crucially, however, the imbalance between the blocs is stark in relation to levels of 
trade dependency. While the EU is the primary market for both Morocco and Tunisia, both 
states hold relatively minor positions in the ranking of EU trade: Morocco is the EU’s 22nd  
largest trading partner and accounts for a mere 1% of the EU’s total trade (European 
Commission 2019a). Tunisia is the EU’s 34th largest trading partner and accounts for a mere 
0.6% of the EU’s total trade (European Commission 2019b). This imbalance in relative 
dependence underpins the EU’s power to leverage its interests and dictate the terms of 
engagement vis-à-vis DCFTAs, reflecting Nkrumah’s (1965), and more recently Zielonka’s 
(2015), analysis of economic dominance.  
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Specifically, the existing trade imbalance is currently being leveraged by the European 
Commission in a number of ways. First, in the asymmetry of trade liberalisation already 
undertaken. This has seen the EU continue to protect its agricultural sector from North African 
imports and subsidise European producers through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
while pursuing liberalisation across African countries (Djafari 2018). This is in keeping with 
the predictions made by Nkrumah (1965) and Touré (1963) about the then EEC seeking to open 
up the markets of the former colonies for European producers, denying local counterparts the 
opportunity to protect their nascent industries and expand, within a neo-colonial form of trade 
relations. The EU’s economic dominance is also reflected in the terms of how the EU has only 
offered to increase export quotas to its markets in return for the full liberalisation of key sectors 
in Morocco and Tunisia. Second, the dominance of the EU is evident in the speed in which it 
is pursuing trade liberalisation. In spite of resistance from civil society and North African 
states’ interests, the EU has been able to limit the proposed transition period to just ten years, 
forcing a rapid transition for the DCFTA signatories and their productive sectors. Djafari 
(2018) argues that ‘the complexity of the DCFTA is incompatible with the ground realities’ 
particularly in relation to the wholescale adoption of EU norms and standards. 
Also corroborating the analysis of Nkrumah and Fanon, the European Commission has 
utilised aid monies via budget support modalities as a means of exerting a neo-colonial form 
of pressure (and incentive) vis-à-vis North African elites. In Tunisia, the European Commission 
allocated €68 million for ‘economic recovery’ in 2012. This occurred only one week after the 
Tunisian government had acquiesced to a so-called ‘Privileged Partnership’ which locked-in 
this North African state to further liberalisation commitments in alignment with the proposed 
EMFTA (Langan 2015a: 108). This is despite the likely consequences of DCFTAs and the 
EMFTA itself for infant industry in the country.  
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Usefully War on Want explain here that the DCFTAs/ EMFTA would lead to the near 
total collapse of key manufacturing industries in the Arab Mediterannean (ibid). This is 
corroborated by Zaafrane and Mahjoub who state that: 
 
In...Tunisia, the portion of industrial production (approximately 10 per cent of 
GDP) threatened by the removal of imports on to tariffs from the EU has been 
estimated at 60 per cent of the total. Half of this output represents activities which 
are genuinely competitive in nature, while the remainder are protected and offer 
no real comparative advantage...[the evidence suggests that] one third of the 
industrial sector will have to be abandoned, while another third will have to be 
redeployed into the third sector (cited in Langan 2015b: 1834). 
 
The Tunisian food, beverages and tobacco sectors would be particularly affected, with a fall of 
production anticipated at around 94.1% (Langan 2015a: 108).  
Moreover, this stark picture is also confirmed within the EU’s own contracted 
Sustainability Impact Assessment which anticipates that Morocco and Tunisia will experience 
job losses of up to 8% of the total manufacturing workforce upon DCFTA implementation, and 
that industry will shrink by 64.1% and 65% in the two North African states respectively 
(Langan 2015b: 1835). The European Apparel and Textile Confederation (Euratex), 
meanwhile, welcomes the deals as a means of easing access to North African consumers, 
despite the deleterious impact for local infant industry (ibid). 
 While the European Commission has been able to operationalise its economic 
dominance to pursue neo-colonial trade ties under DCFTAs, it is important to note that the EU 
is not alone in concluding free trade deals in the region.  Moroccan political elites, in particular, 
have demonstrated their openness to trade liberalisation since the mid-1990s, signing free trade 
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agreements with 58 countries since then. Crucially, however, within this period its trade deficit 
with its partners has worsened, increasing fourfold over the last ten years and equalling nearly 
a quarter of GNP (Gardner 2017). This growth in the trade deficit is largely accounted for by 
its trade with the EU, which has been able to maximise its advantage to the detriment of key 
domestic industries (ibid). As per the original warnings of Nkrumah (1965), local sectors have 
not been able to cope with competition from European exports, which have taken a market 
share from domestic producers and caused a rapid rise in unemployment. The textile industry 
is one example, which has been one of the mainstays of the Moroccan economy and has been 
particularly affected, enduring a loss of nearly 30,000 jobs between 1999 and 2014 (Gardner 
2017).  
Alongside growing precarity in the labour force, issues of food security have also been 
intensified through trade liberalisation in the Arab Mediterranean – issues which would be 
exacerbated under DCFTAs and their emphasis on tariff liberalisation and foreign capital. 
Morocco, for instance, sought to address structural change in its agricultural sector through the 
Plan Maroc Vert. Indeed, Morocco has in recent times been recognised as a state that has made 
some significant progress in the reduction of food insecurity. However, the Plan Maroc Vert is 
based on the maximisation of production through large-scale farms and the diversification of 
production in small scale farms. It has centred on methods to channel external investment 
funds, including global venture capital and Private Agriculture Investment Firms, into 
Moroccan farming (for example, through large scale mechanisation, irrigation and soil 
fertilisation projects). It has also controversially given the opportunity for multinational 
corporations to promote the use and distribution of new seed variants. As a result, the 
agricultural sector and export trade has increased significantly, but this has brought with it 
wide-ranging criticisms of the prioritisation of the interests of large scale agricultural 
businesses over rural farmers living in poverty (Leon 2016).  
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It is also important to note that the impacts of trade liberalisation in the Arab 
Mediterranean are varied, with women and youth often bearing the brunt of reforms such as 
those encompassed within the DCFTAs. While unemployment figures as an aggregate in North 
Africa have been showing a downward trend, the ILO (2016: online) stated that ‘distress 
remains pervasive, particularly among women and youth. Northern Africa still exhibits the 
highest unemployment rate globally, at 12.1 per cent in 2015’. Moreover, North Africa has the 
highest regional youth unemployment rate in the world, ‘at close to 30 per cent in 2015’ with 
high levels of young people not in education, employment or training (that is, NEETs: those 
Not in Education, Employment or Training) (ibid). The ILO further states that ‘recent data 
shows that, among those aged 15-29, NEETs account for 32 per cent in Tunisia (reaching some 
42 per cent of young women) and 40 per cent in Egypt (64 per cent of young women)’ (ibid). 
Interestingly, the existing impact of trade liberalisation upon women and youth in the 
region has prompted the EU to emphasise a discourse of ‘inclusive growth’ as part of the 
negotiations towards DCFTAs. This underpins and reinforces the rhetoric of win-win economic 
interdependence by positioning North African women and young people at the forefront of 
liberalisation strategies. This is corroborated by Salem (2019, this special issue) who 
convincingly demonstrates in this issue how the EU manages the strategic marriage of inclusive 
gender discourse to free trade strategies. In the context of economic growth and DCFTAs, an 
advisor to the European External Action Service usefully articulated this progressive discourse 
of social inclusion via equitable trade:  
 
economic growth and political stability are only sustainable if the growth is 
inclusive. We have to ensure that the growth will be inclusive, that it will address 
the issues of women's empowerment and youth unemployment’ (Alar Olljum, 
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Advisor for North Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq 
for the European External Action Service quoted in Friends of Europe 2012).  
 
This egalitarian EU discourse seeks to allay the fears of domestic civil society actors 
and organisations who have pointed to the potential social repercussions of DCFTAs and 
liberalisation agreements. For example, a wide range of trade unions within the region have 
increasingly adopted a gender perspective, emphasising that women constitute a large 
proportion of the informal work force, and that they may bear the brunt of trade liberalisation.  
Crucially, however, the EU’s discourse of inclusive interdependence has not 
diminished the activism of organised labour and other concerned citizens in the Arab 
Mediterranean regarding the impending impact of DCFTAs. Civil society groups in Tunisia, 
for example, have demanded that EU trade negotiations be accompanied by public 
consultation, and that all negotiating documents be disclosed (Gardner 2017). They have been 
particularly worried by the experience of Morocco’s textile industry and have sought to 
guarantee protection for their own sectors in processes of liberalisation. Other groups have 
taken more radical stances. Alliances of organisations across Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and 
Morocco have called for the end of free trade agreements which they argue - when coupled 
with debt – propagate the imperialist and neo-colonial domination of the region.  
Specifically, the ATTAC/CADTM (Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt) 
Morocco (2015) has mobilised against the DCFTA and the threat posed to the Moroccan 
economy. In addition to calling for greater democracy and transparency surrounding trade 
negotiations, their opposition is explicitly framed in the language of neo-colonialism. The 
group has campaigned against the EU’s neo-colonial ‘partnership’, under the slogan “No to 
colonial agreements, for the defence of people’s sovereign right on their agricultural, food and 
environmental systems” (Climate and Capitalism, 2018). Their campaign works to highlight 
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the economic impact of trade liberalisation with the EU, arguing that this will worsen 
inequalities between regions and classes, and intensify the commodification and dismantling 
of public services. Their campaign places particular focus on the intensification of the control 
of multinational corporations over agriculture and fishing; associated commodity speculation; 
and the generalisation of export-orientated agriculture and the fishing industry. Through these 
and other related movements there is an emergent programme of radical, anti-colonialist 
resistance and action in the Arab Mediterranean. This reflects ongoing concerns about the 
imperial legacies – and the continued relevance of Nkrumah and Fanon for contemporary social 




It is clear from the above discussion that the European Commission has articulated a Eurafrican 
imperial discourse relating to economic interdependence and complementarity within an 
amnestic approach to the Arab Mediterranean. Moreover, the EU’s pursuit of DCFTAs can 
accurately be read in terms of Nicolaidis’ (2015) concept of redirection. EU member states 
have subsumed their competing nationalist impulses within the project of European integration. 
Subsequently, the European project seeks to transpose, and impose, its trade norms onto its 
former colonies in the Arab Mediterranean, and beyond. It is important, however, to 
simultaneously re-engage the work of African luminaries who critiqued neo-colonialism as it 
initially arose. In particular, it is necessary to re-engage the works of Nkrumah (1965), Fanon 
(1961) and Touré (1962) in terms of analysing – and critiquing – Europe’s recourse to a blend 
of trade negotiations and aid delivery in the pursuit of European commercial advantage. EU 
free trade vehicles, including the DCFTAs, perpetuate African countries’ subordinate 
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economic status – since meaningful strategies for economic diversification and 
industrialisation are foreclosed by premature liberalisation. 
 Moreover, as the empirical discussion of the likely impact of DCFTAs demonstrates, 
Europe’s normative discourse stands in stark juxtaposition to the material impact of its trade 
policy. Whereas the European Commission insists that its pursuit of free trade is an opportunity 
for shared prosperity, the consequences of EU import flooding – combined with European 
protectionism embodied in the CAP – leaves little scope for genuine poverty reduction. On the 
contrary, the DCFTAs will exacerbate ill-being and insecurity. On the basis of self-interest 
alone, therefore, it would seem opportune for the EU to rethink its regressive DCFTA agenda 
in light of potential consequences for EU member states themselves vis-à-vis regional 
insecurity. 
 Crucially, local resistance to the DCFTA agenda is currently embodied by a myriad of 
civil society organisations in the Arab Mediterranean who seek to overturn regressive 
liberalisation agendas. Following the logic of Nkrumah’s (1965) analysis of neo-colonialism, 
moreover, it would appear crucial that countries in the Arab Mediterranean should seek closer 
co-operation with sub-Saharan African states to develop their collective position within the 
AU. However, the extent to which a bi-continental Eurafrican free trade zone would disrupt or 
retrench neo-colonial trade relations is now the arena of debate. Only through a united AU 
position, combined with the vocal activism of civil society and trade unions, can genuine 
pressure for change to EU trade liberalisation policies be brought to bear. Mobilising a 
progressive discourse of resistance to neo-colonialism would appear a vital component of such 
pan-African strategies, in countering the Eurafrican mentalities of an amnestic Europe. 
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